[Press Release]

Committee for the Release of North Korean Human Rights Activist Kim Young Hwan
Contact: 02-723-6711, 010-8004-4849

“Chinese Government Should Release Forcibly Incarcerated South Korean Activists”

•Four North Korean human rights activists, including Mr. Kim Young Hwan, are imprisoned by Ministry of State Security, Liaoning Province branch
•Forcible interrogation conducted and consular meeting denied
•Violation of international law and inhumane to disallow meeting with family members

Summary

● Kim Young Hwan left South Korea (March 23, 2012)
● Three other South Koreans and Kim arrested in Dalian (March 29, 2012)
● Kim met with South Korean consul (April 26, 2012)
● Kim’s attorney is appointed and applied for interview (May 10, 2012)
● Three other South Koreans are not yet allowed to meet either consul or attorney

Details

○ Kim Young Hwan, researcher at Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights and activist for North Korean human rights, departed South Korea on March 23 and was arrested on March 29 by Ministry of State Security Liaoning branch in Dalian, China, and he has been detained for fifty days or so.

○ The Republic of Korea’s Consulate General in Shenyang announced that, “Kim and three other South Koreans are detained with a charge of ‘threat to national security (espionage).’” The consulate general interviewed Kim on April 26, but the MSS Liaoning branch did not allow the others to be interviewed.

○ According to the consulate general, MSS Liaoning branch did not answer about the reason of detention. Currently, Kim Young Hwan is known to be incarcerated by the Dandong bureau of MSS. ROK consulate appointed an attorney for Kim and the attorney applied to meet him.

○ In addition, South Korean citizens Yu Jae Gil (44), Kang Shin Sam (42), and Lee Sang Yong (32) were all arrested in Dalian, and known to be separately interrogated in secret. However, MSS Liaoning branch did not specify the reason for detention, whether they are incarcerated, or other details.

○ The three are not allowed to meet consul or attorney, so we do not have information about their safety or condition.

○ We ask the Chinese government to follow international law and allow the South Koreans to meet with consul and family members.

※ Kim Young Hwan has worked for North Korean human rights and democracy since the 1990s. He is a research analyst at NKnet and Zeitgeist.

※Further details will be provided later.

Committee for the Release of North Korean Human Rights Activist Kim Young Hwan

On April 18, NKnet invited former gulag prisoner Mr. Kang Chol Hwan to speak about recent political and social developments in North Korea. Kang is known well for his book, “The Aquariums of Pyongyang,” in which he described his experiences growing up in a North Korean political prison camp. Rather than talking about his internment at the Yoduk political prison camp, Kang provided the audience with an insightful narrative on North Korea’s development over the past 20 years.

Early on in his remarks, Kang reminded the audience of Hwang Jang Yop’s story – a high-ranking cadre who defected to South Korea in 1997. Since Hwang had been a high-ranking government official at the time of his defection he had been well aware of the dire economic climate in North Korea, fearing that the country would be pushed to the brink of collapse in only two or three years. Through his defection, Kang explained that Hwang hoped to prepare the South Korean government for the collapse of North Korea and to facilitate a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. However, these fears never materialized and North Korea managed to endure despite all odds.

Moving on, Kang went on to describe the time of South Korean president Kim Dae Jung’s summit with Kim Jong Il in 2000. Kang said the North was desperate to bring an end to the South’s pervasive psychological warfare tactics along the Demilitarized Zone. South Korean messages about food and supplies were eroding the Northern soldiers’ morale. Therefore, Kim Jong Il set specific preconditions before he agreed to the summit. The number one priority was to end the South’s psychological warfare campaign, including the transmission of radio and balloon messages into the North. Kang explained how North Korean soldiers were eating ramen noodles sent from the south until North Korean officials told them they were poisoned. To circumvent the possible life-threatening hazard, Kang explained that North Korean soldiers would test the noodles on their dogs before trying them for themselves.

In response to suspicions that Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy was a ploy to get the North to democratize, Kang detailed how Kim Jong Il crafted the “Mosquito Net” Strategy to accept aid from the South while simultaneously keeping out the “capitalist” mosquitos. The successful implementation of this policy, in conjunction with substantial aid from the newly elected liberal South Korean government, allowed the North Korean government to temporarily avoid capitulation. Kang mentioned that some South Koreans believe President Kim should have received a “prize for the destruction of peace” rather than the Nobel Peace Prize because the liberal policies towards North Korea enacted under his Presidency gave way to the perception that South Korea was actively supporting the regime in the North.

Two successive liberal presidencies in South Korea ensured aid continued to be sent northward for a decade and a second summit meeting was held shortly before the end of Roh Moo Hyun’s presidency, Kang explained. In this meeting, Kim Jong Il was assured that if the liberals won the presidency again, North Korea would receive even more aid. However, when Kim Jong Il learned that a conservative government was voted into the Blue House, Kang reminded the audience how Kim Jong Il then put the breaks on all inter-Korean dialogue. Kang spoke about his experience working with South Korean policy makers in Lee Myung Bak’s administration who were unable to understand why the North refused to negotiate. His explanation was that Kim Jong Il was something akin to a psychopath because once he made up his mind, there was no changing it.

In speaking on Kim Jong Il’s recent passing, Kang asked the audience to remember that in his last year Kim Jong Il had visited China three times and Russia once. The frequency of these visits was unprecedented, so Kang rhetorically asked the audience why Kim Jong Il would do this. In answering his own question, he doubted that these visits were to request aid from North Korea’s allies because that would be “out of character” for someone of Kim Jong Il’s personality. Rather, Kang suggested these trips were attempts to procure military aircraft. He identified the allied response to the Cheonan sinking and NATO’s intervention in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi as the impetus behind the late Kim’s desire to obtain military aircraft. Kang said that Kim learned two things from these events. The first was the realization that North Korea’s airspace was extremely vulnerable to American and South Korea military aircraft. The second was the pivotal role NATO’s air force played in turning the tide of the Libyan Revolution. This was particularly poignant for Kim Jong Il because Gaddafi’s security apparatus was modeled after his own. Although Gaddafi’s forces were initially successful in combating the rebels, once NATO intervened, his forces were powerless to prevent his downfall. Kang suggested that after being successively rejected by China and Russia, Kim Jong Il became so frustrated that he succumbed to heart disease and passed away.

At the end of his presentation, Kang briefly commented on Kim Jong Un’s prospects as the future leader of North Korea. He point to the youngest Kim’s recent speech during which he was “murmuring and shivering while reading from the script.” Kang posed the question, “How could you expect someone like that to be a successful leader when they are surrounded by their father’s generals who are in their 70s and 80s?” Also commenting, “How could a child with a funny hairstyle rule?” Not surprisingly Kang’s prognosis for Kim Jong Un was “very doubtful.”

Kang also suggested the recent failure of North Korea’s rocket launch had propelled the North Korean people into a state of “mental crisis,” having observed hundreds of millions of dollars that could have been used to feed hungry people literally go up in smoke. He also pointed to China’s growing displeasure with North Korea’s actions in the international arena and unsurprisingly suggested that if China were to withhold aid, it would only be a matter of time until the regime in the North collapses. Furthermore, Kang pointed out that if the conservatives win South Korean presidential elections later this year, it would spell doom for the North Korean regime because in the event that China decides to withhold aid and the president of South Korea is a conservative, North Korea would have nowhere to turn for assistance.

At the end of the lecture portion of the seminar, the audience was eager to probe Kang on a number of related issues. One participant asked if he thought China might want to turn North Korea into a de facto Chinese province. In his response to this question, Kang explained that China is currently undergoing a major power struggle, pointing to the political reforms proposed by Premier Wen Jiabao in the last year as proof of this. Kang also noted that there is a difference of opinion in China regarding North Korea. On the one hand, the older generation of Chinese leaders considers North Korea to be an essential part of their security apparatus, which contrasts with the younger generation who think that North Korea is less important to China’s national interests. Kang suggested that because China is experiencing major reforms, their government does not want to see North Korea liberalize rapidly because that would heavily impact China’s internal struggle for increased political freedom and democracy. In a second follow up question, Kang added that China is also focused on developing its interior. Between these two major initiatives, Kang made clear that China has its hands full, which makes the annexation of North Korea “not likely.”

Another participant noted Kang’s harsh critique of Kim Jong Un’s first public speech and asked about his views on the transition of power between Kim Jong Il and his son. Kang explained that Kim Jong Il confiscated power from his father and fought against his uncle and stepmother for control over the country. By doing so, Kim Jong Il had built his own political power base in the government, which is a stark contrast to Kim Jong Un who “passively inherited” power from his father. Kang pointed out that since Kim Jong Un ascended the North Korean political pyramid in this manner, he does not yet have a firm grip on the more experienced high-ranking officials he is supposed to be leading. Kang also suggested that the current power structure in North Korea is likely to be the same as it was under Kim Jong Il. This is because he handpicked officials who would ensure the continuation of his policies and strategically placed them in the highest offices before he passed away. Despite this, Kang noted that the North Korean political system is not devoid of reform-minded officials. He identified Jang Sung Taek as a potential leader capable of organizing this group of people in the event that North Korea would become open to reform. Kang shared his curiosity as to whether or not North Korea would revise its power structure in April, modeling it after Deng Xiaoping’s revision of China’s power structure from an individual-led system to a group-led system. This would have made reform in North Korea possible but unfortunately it did not happen, so systematic reform in North Korea remains highly unlikely.

In closing, one participant asked Kang what it was like coming to South Korea. He responded that overcoming the culture gap was the most challenging obstacle. In particular when he watched South Korean comedy programs he couldn’t laugh because he didn’t understand the cultural references. At the end of the event, everyone thanked Kang for a fascinating discussion and some participants lined up to have their copies of “The Aquariums of Pyongyang” autographed.

Additional photos from this event:

Facebook photo album: North Korean Human Rights Speaker Series

Media coverage of this event:

N. Koreans won’t buy hype over leader
Korea Times
April 19, 2012

Kwang Chol-hwan on Developments in North Korea
NK News
April 24, 2012

A cocktail of people from the general public to the international community gathered at Seoul’s Artreon Movie Theatre Wednesday, April 11, for the launch of a new program. The brainchild of NKnet, International Supporters for North Korean Human Rights aims to engage the wider society with various NK human rights issues and raise awareness about forced repatriations and restriction of freedom.

The series opened with a screening of Jiru Ishimaru’s 2011 documentary North Korean VJ. In the same evening guest speaker Kang Won Cheol presented a rare opportunity to hear first hand his account as a North Korean defector.

Failed billion-dollar rocket launches, centenary celebrations and recent changes in leadership have earned North Korea a hot place of late in the international spotlight. Yet, little light has been shed on the lives of the ordinary citizens. Considered by many to be the last Stalinist dictatorship, North Korea harbours one of the most secretive regimes in the world. Filmmakers like Ishimaru and defectors like Kang Won Cheol seek to pull down this mantle and work to expose the living reality of the isolated regime.

North Korea VJ, which was first screened at the NKHR International Film Festival last fall, weaves raw footage shot by inside video journalists into a powerful 40-minute narrative. The eye-opening documentary is the product of underground reporters who successfully smuggled their video recordings across borders and eventually into South Korea.

Over the past decade, the Japanese director has trained those defectors resolute to publicise their stories in the art of undercover journalism. Certain imprisonment and possible execution would be the fate of anyone caught filming by the North Korean authorities.

Risking death to document the struggles of the people, one anonymous VJ in a darkened interview room tells the camera, “I know I will be executed if my activities are found out, but I have to let it be known that human rights are being violated. So I collect material.” Another explains why he put his life on the line to expose the world’s most isolated country. “I want to show the world actual lives, not a created version. I want to show every detail.”

The compelling scenes uncover how autonomy is strangled throughout the DPRK. Travel between towns is blocked without an officially stamped document. In one incident caught on camera, women are forced off a train as they lack the required travel permit. Above the doors of the train cars are portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il – a smothering reminder of how the authoritarian regime has a hand around the throat of its people – throttling freedom to the point of asphyxiation.

The documentary further paints an image of ongoing shortages and widespread poverty. Images of orphaned street children forage for food in city gutters at night. Emaciated figures are filmed plucking grass from a sunken land to fill their stomachs. When the camera asks a girl for her name, she is scarcely able to mouth a response before giving up to her dizzying exhaustion.

The theme of escapism recurs as a common coping method throughout the short film. A mother in Pyongyang confesses that she fantasises about suicide every day, but cannot allow herself the luxury because of her dependent young child. Others turn to hard alcohol to survive reality, and as one middle-aged VJ himself does.

Every figure we meet seems to embody an overall aching despair, and yet, astonishingly, there is a vague undercurrent of optimism and defiance present throughout the documentary. Near the end a woman is seen confidently berating a police officer who presumably had tried to prevent her from boarding the back of a truck, which serves as a kind of public transportation. And the film itself is bold proof of what can be done through strong will and hidden cameras, by brave opponents united in their opposition to a repressive regime.

Kang Won Cheol is another such adversary to oppression. Now working at the Daily NK and NK Vision, the former North Korean refugee spoke after the screening, recounting his experience of forced repatriation, a detention center, and life in South Korea today.

In 1998, 16-year-old Won Cheol bargained his life for freedom as he stole across the border into China. He was later captured by officials in Shanghai and forcibly flown back to Pyongyang. Although the danger he faced upon arrival was grave and absolute, the young Won Cheol could not believe the strange twisted luck of the immediate situation. He explained, “before then I had never even seen an aeroplane in North Korea. It would be a dream for any North Korean to ride on an aeroplane.” Wanting to remember every moment, he decided to save his flight meal. Yet, the otherwise happy realisation of a childhood wish was drenched in a bitter irony. The first flight which many had dreamed of their whole lives would return him to the nightmare from which he fled.

Held for six months in a defector’s detention prison, Won Cheol was subject to interrogation. Upon entry the police grilled him for a week demanding answers to three questions, “Did you meet any South Koreans in China? Did you meet any Christian missionaries? Did you try to go to South Korea?” He explained, “if I had answered one question ‘yes’ I would be sent to a far worse gulag. So I had to lie. They tortured me, but they did not get the truth.” Had he collapsed under interrogation, he would not be able to tell his story today.

Kang then described life inside the prison camp. Every day guards would shout to the 350-400 male and female detainees: “You are traitors. You must die.” He occasionally witnessed torture and saw people die of poor sanitation and starvation around him. He recalled how a baby he saw born inside the camp and die within minutes because of the appalling conditions.

“One memory will haunt me forever,” he recounted. “Some days we were told to be up at 5am for work. One morning I woke early and turned to rouse the person lying next to me. But they did not move. They did not wake up. It turned out that they had died in their sleep in the night.”

The traditional Korean funeral ceremony mandates that the deceased have an earthen mound over their grave so the living can pay reverence. The most distressing element of the prison camp for Kang was how the guards did not honour the dead. Thirteen times he witnessed people die inside the camp walls. Deemed undeserving of traditional Korean burial by the authorities, the bodies were stored in a warehouse and then buried anonymously into earth graves.

As Kang was young, he was released from the detention center within half a year. Whilst witnessing the horrors inside the prison, he swore to himself that he would never attempt escape again. Yet, Kang’s positive outlook swayed his nightmares to dreams once more. He recalls, “but I had seen the outside world in China. And I realised that everything in North Korea is a lie. So I decide to defect yet again.” Later, in China he met a Korean missionary who aided his escape from China. The second time, he was successful.

Watching North Korea VJ, the former prisoner reflected upon his experiences. Although on the surface not too much seems to have changed – poverty is rampant and freedom is as restricted as ever – Kang noticed subtle traces of insurrection. He observed that men and women are slowly rising against the authorities. Like the elderly women who protested when the guards forcibly removed them from the train, the journalists and Kang Won Cheol himself, it is clear that the people want their voices heard. The documentary itself is emblematic of protest. As one VJ says, “although I am only one person, I hope I will be a spark.”

The series continues Wednesday evenings at 6:30 p.m. through May 16 at Sinchon’s Artreon Theatre.

Additional photos from this event:

Facebook photo album: North Korean Human Rights Speaker Series

    • After the formal portion of each event we will continue the discussion and get to know each other better at a nearby establishment.
    • When the speaker series concludes, we look forward to your ongoing participation as a volunteer member of NKHR Supporters.

When: April 11 – May 16 (every Wednesday) at 6:30 p.m.
Where: Sinchon (directions below)

Schedule

Wed., April 11, 6:30 p.m.
- Screening of “North Korea VJ,” featuring secretly shot video of real life in North Korea
- A Refugee’s Story: Forced Repatriation and Refugees in China
Kang Won Cheol (Daily NK and NK Vision)
Read a write-up and view photos of this event

Wed., April 18, 6:30 p.m.
- North Korean Human Rights Violations: Focusing on NK’s Political Prison Camps
Kang Chol Hwan (North Korea Strategy Center; former child prisoner at Yoduk Prison Camp who told his story in “Aquariums of Pyongyang”) – past talks by Kang Chol Hwan
Read a write-up and view photos of this event

Wed., April 25, 6:30 p.m.
- Prospects of the Hereditary Succession
Andrei Lankov (Professor at Kookmin University) – an interview with Dr. Lankov last summer
RSVP via Facebook for 4/25

Wed., May 2, 6:30 p.m.
- The North Korean Human Rights Movement
Kim Sang Heon (Database Center for North Korean Human Rights)
RSVP via Facebook for 5/2

Wed., May 9, 6:30 p.m.
- Information Freedom Activities in North Korea
Chris Green (The Daily NK)
RSVP via Facebook for 5/9

Wed., May 16, 6:30 p.m.
- International Society’s Role
Joanna Hosaniak (Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights)
- What can we do? A Discussion on How to Participate
Dan Bielefeld (NKnet)
RSVP via Facebook for 5/16

Directions*

1. Exit number 4 of Sinchon station, line 2 (green line)
2. Walk straight for a couple minutes until you come to the Artreon Movie Theater on your left.
3. Just past the big escalators are a Starbucks and a T-World mobile store. Use the entrance just past the mobile store — you will see “www.artreon.co.kr” above the doorway.
4. The Artreon Toz is on the 14th floor of the building — please use the elevator** on your right as you enter from the street.
* please check our website or Facebook page for any changes
** There’s usually a wait for the elevator to the 14th floor, so please try to arrive a bit early if possible.

RSVP

While not required, please let us know if you plan to attend the speaker series to help us better prepare each week. To RSVP, use the Facebook event pages listed above, 02-723-6711, or webmaster ~AT~ nknet ~DOT~ org.

If you attend 4 or more of the 6 nights we’ll give you a DVD box set of the films from last fall’s North Korean Human Rights International Film Festival!

International Supporters for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR Supporters)
A project of the Network for North Korean Democracy & Human Rights (NKnet)
With support from the International Republican Institute

The following is the second half of an interview with B.R. Myers that appeared on pages 56-59 in the February 2012 issue of NK Vision magazine. Transcription courtesy of NKnet volunteers Arnaud Minne and Leanna Ross. Part one of the interview is here.

You say North Korea has additional –

North Korea has 민족주의 (nationalism, specifically one which is based on a race or people) and North Korea also has state patriotism. I was in North Korea in June and you can tell when you talk to people that even though they didn’t particularly like Kim Jong Il, they were very proud of the North Korean state. They are very proud of their country as a state. And this is very different to South Korea, where people are proud of the race. They are proud of the race’s history, but they are actually quite ashamed of the state; they do not support the state very strongly. I’m thinking back to President Roh Moo Hyun in 2003 (I think) during his 삼일절 (March 1 Independence Movement Day) speech when he said that in South Korea justice was defeated. This is a very common way of thinking in South Korea. South Koreans wrongly believe that North Korea got rid of all its 친일파 (pro-Japanese faction) and South Korea did not, therefore North Korea started out better than South Korea. As I write in my book, 왜 북한은 극우의 나라인가? (Why is North Korea a Far Right State?) there were plenty of 친일파 in North Korea. In fact, Kim Il Sung welcomed many really bad 친일파 intellectuals to North Korea and gave them very high posts. But unfortunately, the myth of a pure North Korea is still very strong in South Korea and it affects the way that people think about North Korea. This is a weakness that I think Pyongyang is going to exploit.

And if North Korea engages South Korea militarily in this coming year, what should the South Korean government do about this? It seems like they’re trying to be pacifist and trying to have a summit or talks with the North Koreans.

First of all, I don’t believe that Lee Myung Bak has taken a hardline policy towards North Korea. Many people in South Korea say he was too hard. Let’s remember, South Korea was attacked twice by North Korean troops in 2010 and South Korea did not really retaliate. I know they fired back during the Yeonpyeong Island attack but South Korea did not even try to punish North Korea very severely for those attacks. So the Lee Myung Bak administration has always followed, I think, a moderate policy towards North Korea.

And in the past few weeks I think South Korea was unnecessarily polite about the death of Kim Jong Il. Remember, the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) continually refers to Lee Myung Bak as the 역적 (traitor) and talks about its administration as the 역적패당 (gang of traitors). North Korea continues to even write the word 한국 (the South Korean term for “South Korea”) in inverted commas – or 정부 (government) or 국희의사당 (National Assembly), yeah, so-called. And what does South Korea do? In South Korea everybody says Kim Jong Il 국방위원장 (Defense Commission Chairman), you know, 깍듯이 (courteously), and that too conveys to North Korea the impression that the South Koreans do not really feel much pride in their state, South Koreans don’t care if their state is insulted.

And I find it even stranger now when Kim Jong Un’s full title is quoted in the South Korean media all the time. And we need to remember that the title 국방위원장 (Defense Commission Chairman) is actually a very strange title for South Korea to use, because to use the word 국 implies that South Korea recognizes North Korea as a country, as a 국가. To talk of the국방위원장, to talk of 국방 (national defense) – that implies that South Korea recognizes that North Korea’s arms program is for defensive purposes. So, these things seem very small to (South) Korean people but I think they all give North Korea the wrong impression that South Koreans are not particularly proud or particularly identifying strongly with their own state. So I don’t think that the Lee administration should have made any statement of sympathy to North Korea after the death of the man who attacked South Korea twice.

South Korea’s definitions of “conservatism” and “progressive” are not like those in other countries, they rely on attitudes toward North Korea very heavily and that has characterized South Korean politics and social divisions. Do you think this will play a role in these two elections, the general (parliamentary) election and the Presidential election?

That depends on what North Korea does. If North Korea wants South Korea to talk about North Korea, it’s going to engage in more provocations. If North Korea stays quiet, then I don’t think the North Korean issue is going to be a very big one in the elections. In most of the country, people simply are not very interested in North Korea. They’re much more interested in things like half-price tuition, the gap between rich and poor, education. Those issues are much more important I think than North Korea. Of course in the Jeolla provinces, they have economic reasons to want the Sunshine Policy to resume, because during the Sunshine Policy a lot of rice was sent to North Korea and the rice farmers were of course very happy with that. But generally, I don’t think North Korea is an important issue to most people in South Korea.

Besides inter-Korean relations, there are the relationships between North Korea and other countries like the United States, China, Japan, and currently there is a negotiation going on in New York between Pyongyang and Washington and also there is the prospect that the six-party talks with negotiations over North Korean nukes will resume. What is your intuition…?

I think that the talks can resume, but they will not bear any significant fruit. North Korea needs an enemy figure, you cannot have a military-first regime without an enemy. If North Korea were to normalize relations with the United States, that would really leave absolutely no reason for North Korea to exist as a country. The North Korean people then would say, “Our country is a poor partner of America. South Korea is a rich partner of America. Why shouldn’t we live in the southern half of the country and at least enjoy the benefits of a healthy economy?” So North Korea cannot possibly normalize relations with the United States, it cannot disarm, it cannot freeze its nuclear program without losing all legitimacy in front of its own citizens and that’s not going to happen. I think that North Korea only engages in negotiations as a way of managing the tension, because North Korea is afraid of a real war breaking out between Pyongyang and Washington. So they negotiate in order to keep the tension down – to manage the tension – but I don’t think that it’s ever going to lead to anything.

What do you think the roles of the patrons like Jang Sung Taek, Kim Kyong Hui, or other senior military officials play for the stabilization of Kim Jong Un? Because many people, partly because they saw this at other times in history, they expect that these people, especially Jang Sung Taek, will not be as loyal as he was when Kim Jong Il was alive.

Those people, Jang Sung Taek and Kim Kyong Hui, they also have every reason to want this system to continue, they have absolutely no reason to want to make life difficult for the new leader. Now I don’t know to what extent they will be pulling the strings behind Kim Jong Un, but I don’t believe that there is any significant ideological disagreement between them or between anybody else in the North Korean elite. So, I think the world is, and I said this in my New York Times article yesterday, too, the world is a little bit too obsessed with the personalities in North Korea. I think many people misperceive North Korea as a kind of Soviet state, and they think, “Well, in the Soviet Union, we had hard-liners and soft-liners, so maybe inside North Korea there are hard- and soft-liners.” Well, we have no evidence of that at all. And, just as importantly, we have no way of knowing what kind of job these people are going to do. In the South Korean media and in the Japanese media, you always hear about these 소식통 (sources), these people high up who know exactly what’s going on at the top of the North Korean government. Well, I don’t believe those 소식통. If those 소식통 were any use, we would not have found out about Kim Jong Il’s death at the last moment, just like everybody else did. In other words, we have no way of knowing what’s going on at the top of the North Korean power structure. So instead of focusing on personalities, we need to focus on North Korea’s ideology, and on North Korea’s propaganda, because those things are going to give us a much better idea of where the country is heading.

I was impressed by your insights about North Korea’s extreme nationalism and far right characteristics. Also, when I talked to a defector a few years ago, he told me about the North Korean military’s plan of exterminating “half breeds” – when they conquer South Korea they had planned to make a camp for the “half breeds” in South Korea. So I pretty much agree when you interpret North Korea as a country that breeds extreme nationalism. What do you think characterizes North Korea as a society or system in terms of nationalism?

(That’s amazing.) I would say it’s a paranoid, ethno-nationalist state on the far right of the ideological spectrum. I think if you want to compare it to any kind of political force in the past, I would compare it to the pro-Soviet wing of the Nazi party. Many people forget that the Nazi party used to be pro-Soviet until Hitler took over. Hitler took over and changed the Nazi party into an anti-Soviet party, but before Hitler, the Nazi party was pro-Soviet, and it was in favor of complete nationalization of the economy, and I think that’s exactly where North Korea is ideologically. It favors a command economy, but it is certainly not a left-wing state. You can just tell by the reaction after Kim Jong Il died when they said they don’t want foreigners to come and mourn in Pyongyang. That’s a very un-communist reaction. Communism is all about breaking down nationalism, about uniting workers around the world, and North Korea has always been about the opposite, it’s been about racial purity and pride, so remember North Korea was isolated even inside the old east-block, even inside the Soviet block.

Do you think reunification is possible or is a viable option any time in the future?

Well, I do think that the public enthusiasm in North Korea for the state is declining. I think it declined a big step in 1994 when Kim Il Sung died, and I think this public, this 국가정신 (state or national spirit, state patriotism), has also declined since the death of Kim Jung Un, and I think that, as time goes on, people are going to be less and less interested in political and ideological life, and more interested in making money, in breaking the law in order to enrich their own families and in order to prepare for the collapse of North Korea.

I think sooner or later, a tipping point is going to be reached where the North Korean government suddenly finds itself in some kind of a difficult situation, and there’s only one real way for North Korea to react to that kind of situation, and that is to increase tension with the outside world. And I think that someday North Korea will go a step too far, North Korea will maybe engage in some kind of nuclear provocation, or it will attack South Korea, and it will finally induce South Korea and the United States to fight back, and when that happens, North Korea is going to collapse. So, I do think that regime collapse is inevitable in North Korea, and when the regime collapses in North Korea, you will have the 흡수통일 (reunification through absorption, a.k.a., German-style reunification). I know the South Koreans don’t want a 흡수통일, but the West Germans did not want it either, and in the end they had to do it in order to keep the East Germans in East Germany. They had to unite the country, and they will do the same thing here in South Korea in order to keep the North Koreans all from coming south.

Won’t China try to interfere in North Korea in order to prevent U.S. forces from going to the Yalu (River)?

Yeah, well if the North Korean regime collapses, there’s nothing the Chinese are going to do. The Chinese cannot install a pro-Chinese government in Pyongyang, because the North Korean people are too nationalist to accept that. So, even if the Chinese are not particularly happy about it, they will have no choice but to allow the North Korean regime to collapse. Now, what they may do after collapse, is send Chinese soldiers into North Korea to help keep the peace, and then perhaps they will try to negotiate a deal with South Korea and the United States. The deal might be something like this: We will allow the two Koreas to reunify under the condition that American troops do not move any further north than they are now. And that would be a deal very similar to the deal that West Germany made with the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Does that mean some kind of cooperation among China, South Korea and the United States would be necessary?

I think it’s necessary, and I think there will be cooperation. The Chinese are rational people, and I think in the long run they’re going to realize that a unified Korea is not necessarily against China’s interests.

It seems that some Chinese experts, in their recent interviews, say that a unified Korea is inevitable at some point, but the only thing that China is concerned about is they don’t want to bring American troops too close to them.

Right, and they may demand neutrality for Korea, and that’s something that Korea has to think about. It’s strange to say that China must accept unification and China must accept that we will always be an American ally. We can’t expect China to accept that. I think Korea needs to be ready to at least negotiate the possibility of becoming a neutral country, if that’s what it takes to get the Chinese to approve of reunification. I don’t think that’s too high a price to pay.

I wanted to ask you about the South Korean people’s fear of a Chinese occupation of North Korea in case of collapse. I tell everyone it’s too exaggerated because every defector I meet or every North Korean I talk to, they’re, as you said, they’re nationalists, so a Sino-Korean alliance doesn’t mean that North Korean people are friendly or they have gratitude toward the Chinese people, they reject everyone else except Koreans, not just the Americans.

Well, that’s what we saw with the Korean War. Even in the Korean War when North Korea depended on China to survive, they were still not working with the Chinese together, they did not even want to let the Chinese have control of the North Korean railway system. So, why would they allow China to take over the country now? I think it’s completely impossible, and the Chinese are aware of that, and the Chinese don’t want it. China is not an expansionist power, in that sense. They could’ve taken North Korea in 1995 if they wanted to, but they didn’t, so I don’t think that’s as big a problem. But, it shows you that South Koreans are very nationalist, too, because in South Korea nobody cares if the North Korean people starve to death, but they get very nervous about the Chinese people investing heavily in North Korea and they get very worried about the prospect of China maybe taking over North Korea. In other words, they only worry about North Korea in terms of nationalist problems and nationalist questions.

The following is the first half of an interview with B.R. Myers that appeared on pages 56-59 in the February 2012 issue of NK Vision magazine. Transcription courtesy of NKnet intern Dahyeon Lee and editing by volunteer Darren Southcott.

B.R. Myers is an American expert on North Korea. He received his MA degree in Soviet studies at Ruhr University and PhD degree in North Korean literature at the University of Tubingen. His recent book, The Cleanest Race (2010), explores North Korean propaganda, film and novels to see how North Koreans perceive themselves. He teaches international studies at Dongseo University in Busan.

What factors are important for Kim Jong Un to successfully take power?

A lot of international observers seem to think that Kim Jong Un is going to have a hard time consolidating power inside the North Korean elite, and I disagree because I think that Kim Jong Un is really the only person who can expect to rule North Korea and still hold on to some kind of popular support. So, I believe, as I said in a New York Times article that appeared yesterday, I said that the real challenge that Kim Jong Un faces is not the problem of how to secure power inside the elite, his bigger problem is, “How does this regime, how does this republic continue to justify itself alongside a very successful South Korean state?” So really his problem is exactly the same as his father’s problem was. How do you keep the people motivated? How do you continue to inspire them to make sacrifices when you have a much more successful state next door. And, unfortunately, I think the only way that the regime can justify its existence is by engaging in regular displays of military strength and superiority, so I expect more incidents similar to what we saw in 2010.

So do you interpret the recent appearance of Kim Jong Un in military drills and in a tank to indicate that North Korea will undertake similar military provocations?

Well, the fact that he – from the very beginning he was described as 대장 (general), in other words, from the very beginning, emphasis was on his military rank, so we knew from the start that there was not going to be any change from the military first policy. Now, if you have a military first policy – how do you show the people that it’s working? The only way to do that is by flexing your muscles. It’s by engaging in some kind of military act. Now, that doesn’t necessarily mean that North Korea is going to attack South Korean forces again, but it does mean that Kim Jong Un has to show his people some kind of military successes. Perhaps that could be just a matter of launching a missile over Japan again, or it could be a matter of another nuclear test. But those kind of successes are actually more important for the regime than economic growth is.

It seems like your premise is that the military is already supporting Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un does not have to worry about the military’s support.

Right. I mean Kim Jong Un does not have to worry about any kind of challenge to his power from inside the elite because in Kim Il Sung Country, as it calls itself – it calls itself 김일성의 나라, or it calls itself 김일성 민족 (Kim Il Sung’s People) – in that kind of a country, the only person who could possibly take over is somebody from inside this great household, this 가문. And that means that the only two people who could possibly challenge Kim Jong Un would be his older brothers, Kim Jong Nam and Kim Jong Chul. And they have both indicated, well Kim Jong Nam has indicated that he’s not interested in the job, and Kim Jong Chul is obviously not suited to take over at all. Now, maybe American people think that the military must be angry that Kim Jong Un has received a high rank inside the military without having done military service. That just shows that those people don’t really understand the personality cult. It’s actually a great honor for the North Korean Army that the leader of the country has military rank. It shows that nobody is above the military in North Korea. And the military’s goals and the party’s roles are really exactly the same. Neither the military nor the party has any reason to want to weaken Kim Jong Un’s rule. So I expect that they will stay united behind him.

When do you expect the propaganda for Kim Jong Un’s idolization will take place? For example, yesterday the North Korean state media mentioned very briefly about his mother.

Exactly. That was interesting for me because really, there are so many big challenges for the propaganda artists in glorifying this man. By mentioning his mother, they have already made clear that Kim Jong Il actually had a family, and that was something that the North Korean media never reported about when Kim Jong Il was alive. So these are very big and important challenges for the propaganda apparatus. The problem is that the more difficulty they have in glorifying him, the more likely they are going to be to make him want to engage in some show of military superiority so that he has some kind of military achievement or 업적 (achievement) on his record. I can’t say for sure how they’re going to glorify him yet, but we’ve seen enough indications that it’s going to focus primarily on military themes. That’s why we’ve seen him in military contexts for the past two weeks.

Does that mean that Kim Jong Un as a new leader will take military positions first or foremost instead of party positions?

Well, even Kim Jong Il, I mean Kim Jong Il was also the general secretary of the Worker’s Party. But that title of 총비서 was actually not a very important title. It was almost always Kim Jong Il 위대한 영도자 (Dear Leader), 위대한 장군님 (Great General), so the party title was not a very important one for Kim Jong Il, and I don’t think the party title’s going to be very important for Kim Jong Un either.

Then will Kim Jong Un be likely to keep the 대장 (general) title?

Yeah, I think he will be called 대장 or he will be called 최고사령관 (the supreme commander) or he will be called just 경애하는 영도자 (Dear Leader – the term used in Korean here is slightly different than the one usually rendered in English as Dear Leader – Ed.) Kim Jong Un, etc. I don’t think they’ll be calling him 총비서 (general secretary) or anything like that, even if he does take that position, which is not clear yet. But even if he does become a general secretary, I don’t think they’ll be referring to him as the general secretary every day.

So your assessment is that North Korean market forces or North Korea’s popular demands or popular factors are not as important as military or internal power-elite factors?

In North Korea under Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung’s legitimacy, or 정당성, rested on two pillars. The one pillar was the economy, economic growth and material comfort, and the other pillar was military strength. But Kim Jong Il’s rule and Kim Jong Un’s rule, they both rest on military strength alone. That does not mean that Kim Jong Un does not want economic growth. Of course he wants it. But economic growth is not central to his legitimacy as a ruler. If the North Korean economy grows by 10% or even 20%, it is still way behind the South Korean economy. And that means that no North Korean leader can hold up economic growth as a very big success for the republic. So I think that while the government is going to keep trying to do what it can to improve the economy, military strength, nuclear armament, these things are much more important to the new regime.

The North Korean regime repeatedly has announced that they’ll be a strong and prosperous nation by 2012. How do you interpret this term?

It’s a very vague term. It first emerged in North Korea in 1998, about a week before they fired that missile over Japan. And then, for several years, for about 10 years really, they talked about the 강성대국 (strong and prosperous nation) only as something that would happen in the future. They did not say when in the future. Then Lee Myung Bak was elected in November 2007 and I think the North Korean government panicked a little bit because the election of a conservative, anti-Pyongyang president by the South Korean people was very difficult for the North Korean propaganda to explain. It was really the first time in South Korea’s history that the South Korean public had voted for a conservative president in a completely free election. And this was a problem for the Worker’s Party propaganda because the whole goal of life in North Korea is to liberate South Korea from American rule. Well, how do you tell your people that they have to keep sacrificing in order to strengthen North Korea in order to liberate South Korea when the South Korean people themselves do not want to be liberated? So, I think this pressure panicked the North Korean government into announcing in January 2008 that the strong and prosperous country would come in 2012. In other words, it was as if they realized that the North Korean people would not continue making sacrifices forever. They wanted see some kind of material growth very quickly. But almost as soon as they made that promise, almost as soon as they put a year on the strong and prosperous country, they began to backpedal. In other words, they began to reduce public expectations for the strong and prosperous nation. So, if you look at strong and prosperous nation posters from 2005 or 2006, you can see people sitting behind a table full of meat, like chicken, pork, steak and things like that. But if you look at the more recent posters of the strong and prosperous nation, which appeared since 2010, people are only sitting behind tables with rice and potatoes, vegetables, things like that. So, that makes me think that the government is trying to lower expectations and, in a sense, the death of Kim Jong Il has helped the North Korean propaganda because now they can say, “Well, we were just about to open the great gate (대문을 열기) to a strong and prosperous country, but we lost our Dear Leader, our Dear General, and therefore we need to concentrate completely on our military and on our defenses again for a short time.” I think that might be what the government does because obviously North Korea is not ready to announce that it has become a strong and prosperous country.

So do you think that the North Korean government will recant their promise?

They’re not going to recant it, but we already have indications that they’re going to talk about 강성대국 시대가 시작되는 것이다 (The era of a strong and prosperous nation has begun.). Instead of saying 우리가 딱 2012년에 강성대국을 이루겠다 (We will become a strong and prosperous nation by 2012.), they are now saying 2012년부터 강성대국 시대가 시작될 것이다 (The era of a strong and prosperous nation will begin in 2012.) and we don’t really know what that means. That could mean that 2012년에서야 (only from 2012) this new period is going to start in earnest (본격적으로). We don’t really know what they mean, but it’s very vague. It’s much more vague than it was a few years ago.

But didn’t they temporarily replace 강성대국 (strong and prosperous nation) with 강성국가 (though these terms are slightly different in Korean, they both mean “strong and prosperous nation” – Ed.)?

Well, they are saying things like 군사강국 (militarily strong state) and things like that. They’re using words like that a lot. But, you know, the word 강성 in 강성대국, of course in English it means prosperity, but it doesn’t necessarily have to be material, consumer comfort, you know. I think the phrase itself is quite vague. But they have commented, in the 공동사설 (Joint New Year’s Editorial), they have spoken a lot about the need to improve the supply of consumer goods, so I think it’s going to remain a big priority for the government, but North Korea is not going to give up military superiority or military strength in order to get economic growth. I don’t think that’s going to happen.

The South Korean government, right after Kim Jong Il’s death, tried to reach out to the new North Korean regime. It seems like, at this point, the North Korean government rejected that offer and they’re as hawkish as they have been before, since two years ago. How do you expect the inter-Korean relationship will unfold, especially given there is an election?

Yeah, that’s the main thing. Obviously, the Kim Jong Un regime has absolutely no reason to want to make any concessions to the Lee Myung Bak administration at this time, because if North Korea were to do that, it would convey the impression to the South Korean voters that Lee Myung Bak’s North Korea policy, his 대북정책, had been a correct policy. So, the North Koreans have to continue insulting the Lee administration. They have to continue refusing to work with the Lee administration in the hope that South Korean voters will elect a left-wing government into power at the end of this year. Obviously, North Korea will much rather get aid without conditions than get aid with conditions. And if the South Korean left-wing, the so-called progressives, get into power, North Korea can expect, I think, a resumption of unilateral, unconditional aid. So, Kim Jong Un really only needs to get through this year, and then I think a lot of money is going to start coming in.

In previous South Korean presidential elections, North Korea has a history of trying to intervene in South Korean politics or elections by military provocation and summits other actions. Do you think they will try the same again?

I think they would try it again. It’s very strange because in divided Germany, whenever there was an election in West Germany, the East Germans would be very nice and very polite, and they would talk about peace all the time, because they knew that if they acted aggressively, that would help the West German conservatives in the election. But South Korea is a very different case, because in 2010 the North Koreans sank the Cheonan, and a few weeks after that, the South Korean voters went to the polls and voted for pro-Pyongyang or for soft-line parties. And then you have the Yeonpyeong attack, and even though South Koreans were much more angry about Yeonpyeong Island than about the Cheonan sinking, in 2011 they only again voted for the pro-Pyongyang or pro-Sunshine Policy kind of parties. So I think North Korea might have learned from that – that if it attacks South Korea, if it raises the tension, that will actually be bad for the South Korean conservatives. So, that gives North Korea an extra reason to behave badly this year. So I do expect some kind of unpleasantness from North Korea in the months ahead.

So you mean national security used to be, or is supposed to be better for the conservatives in South Korean politics?

But now it isn’t anymore. Unfortunately, it isn’t anymore. And that makes it a very scary situation because that means that North Korea has an advantage to be gained, has an incentive to engage in hostility.

Is that a side-effect of the Sunshine Policy?

Well, I think the general problem is that South Korea does not have, the South Korean public lacks 국가정신 (state or national spirit). In other words, lacks patriotism. In South Korea, you have very strong nationalism, but the nationalism undermines state patriotism, or 국가정신. And the North Koreans are aware of this. They know that if they attack the South Korean army, the South Korean people will not be very angry. The South Korean people get much more angry when the Japanese say something bad about Dokdo. So, I think the North Koreans are aware of this. They are aware that South Korea is very weak in this respect. And I think it’s a very dangerous problem, and I don’t think that enough people in South Korea are aware of this problem of the lack of 국가정신. When you have a divided nation, in other words, a divided 민족 (nation or people), and only one half of that 민족 has 국가정신, namely North Korea, then other half is in a very dangerous and weak position. We saw this in Vietnam as well. In many ways, South Korea is similar to South Vietnam because in South Vietnam as well, nationalism undermined patriotism.

Read the second half of this interview.

The emcee of the event and Gershman himself commented on the family nature of the gathering. Indeed, NED and some of its partners present at the luncheon have worked together for over 15 years.

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“Of course South Korean people don’t read the reports that catalogue the horrendous human rights abuses in the North. Only through personal anecdotes, making the reader smile and feel touched, can we inform. Anyone can just read and enjoy, and at the same time the important thing is that they are reading something that truly reflects the reality of North Korea.”

The following article appeared on pages 56-59 in the October 2011 issue of NK Vision magazine. Translation courtesy of NKnet volunteer Peter Ward.

The things that usually spring to mind first when the “North Korean problem” is mentioned are starvation, human rights violations, nuclear weapons, and the succession of Kim Jong Un. In North Korea, where an unprecedented third generation succession is taking place, life for the populace is difficult due to economic troubles. But this is because the leadership chooses to stroke tensions on the Korean peninsula through nuclear development. Because of this, whether it be for South Koreans or people worldwide, North Korea is associated with a host of problems. In a time when there are 20,000 North Korean refugees living in South Korea, the abuses that they have informed us of are not merely a South Korean problem but a global issue that must be solved by us all.

It is true that the 24 million people of North Korea do not have easy lives but the way they live is in defiance of dictatorship. It is self-evident in the course of unification that with brotherly love we must first understand their lives. The books of refugees are really helpful in understanding the North but there are limits. There is a writer facing up to these problems by writing extensively about the lives of North Korean people. We speak of Lim Il (43, entered South Korea in 1997), whose recent book, Kim Jong Il: A Novel, received a lot of attention. NK Vision recently met with Lim, who is often referred to by the title of “refugee writer,” to discuss his latest work.

Must overcome cultural differences to unite North and South

Lim Il believes that whilst it is important to inform people about the nuclear issue and human rights, in order to combine the two cultures of North and South Korea it is necessary that we have a cultural understanding of the people of North Korea. In other words, cultural differences could become an impediment to unification. Looking back to the time when he started writing six years ago in 2005, he explained that, “At the time it seemed that unification would come soon, because this was when the September 19 Joint Statement was made, as agreed to in the Six-Party Talks in 2005. I remember, I thought at the time that unification would certainly happen in the next 10 years but that the cultural divide was (and is) so big. So in order to help overcome this I started writing.”

At the time, as he became aware of the fact that most books written about the North dealt with human rights and/or the nuclear issue, he resolved to write in order to inform people of North Korean society more generally. “There are many issues related to North Korea but you cannot explain the country purely through highlighting only its dark side. Merely focusing on the dark side of the country has the effect of creating prejudice towards the country and the refugees from it. It gives rise to the ideas like “North Korea is a bad place” and/or “North Koreans are not our brothers and sisters, they are strangers.” Above all, he thinks that if unification comes, Koreans must live as one country. And he says that to do that it is essential to overcome inter-Korean cultural differences. This is his reason for writing.

Kim Jong Il: A Novel, painting North Korea as it is

Whilst books related to human rights issues help enhance one’s understanding of North Korea, he thinks that there are limits to how much can be known through such sources. Lim was born in Pyongyang and had only lived there until he was dispatched to Kuwait for work, so he did not know what provincial life was like in North Korea. But after arriving in South Korea he found out about the North’s human rights situation and food problems. But he also thinks that writing about his 29 years of life in Pyongyang will help people understand North Korea better. He has written three books of essays and two novels based on his life experiences in Pyongyang. He details what life was like settling in South Korea in Should I Go Back to Pyongyang? (Clear Sound, 2005), and in Unbelievable Pyongyang (Clear Sound, 2007) and in Seoul Rather Than Pyongyang (Clear Sound, 2009) he emphasizes that North Korea is also a place where ordinary people live.

“I thought it would be helpful to South Korean people in understanding defectors through the small experiences and resettled life amidst the maelstrom of South Korea.” He goes on to say, “I think it is important that people realise that even in North Korea, people fall in love, they marry and they have families.” He further emphasises that “In my books I compare Seoul and Pyongyang. It is often assumed that Seoul is a diverse and culturally rich place whilst Pyongyang is monotonous, without variation. I try to show that North Korea also is culturally interesting and colourful.” His journal of life after coming to South Korea, Should I Go Back to Pyongyang?, has been lauded for the way it explains with great wit and insight the culture shock he experienced and how he overcame it. More than anything, Lim wants to write not about politics but about universal topics that appeal to all and can be read by all.

With this in mind he has recently published Kim Jong Il: A Novel (Zeitgeist, 2011). This book, written with great imagination, details the myriad of suspicions and doubts that surround the character of Kim Jong Il. Whilst it is made up, it stimulates the reader’s curiosity and makes for great reading. In the story, Kim Jong Il relates in an interview that his father Kim Il Sung’s death was faked and that he is still alive and well. The book’s most explosive part is that he – Kim Jong Il – has been in charge of the country from 1974, 20 years before the “death” of his father, and he sought to prevent the planned 1994 North-South summit from taking place in order to prevent a South-led unification from happening. And, moreover, the book goes on to suppose that the man purporting to be Kim Jong Il, who met Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and had a stroke, was a double.

When dealing with the character of Kim Jong Il, he opines that “Kim Jong Il is the scary one. He can decide whether to use nuclear weapons or not. The frightening thing about nuclear weapons is that Kim Jong Il is a frightening dictator. But South Koreans know nothing of this man. They are ignorant about North Korea and Kim Jong Il. So, although it is fiction, I did my best to describe him as close to reality as possible.” Lim went on to say that, “Books that discuss Kim Jong Il just talk about him as a ruthless dictator, but my book draws a picture of a human being with emotions, it is a frank portrait. If it were merely a damning polemic, progressives would not want to read it. I hope that people on the Left will read it and see Kim Jong Il as he really is.”

Showing contemporary North Korea through heartfelt expression

To him, words are the expression of thought but because writing is the expression of the heart, he believes he can move the hearts of South Koreans through his writings. He thinks that telling South Koreans about the lives of North Koreans through writing is his calling in life. “If you are a refugee, you have to have a mission. Both North and South Koreans, before and even after unification can read my work on life after resettlement in the South. It will help both sides understand the differences between the two countries.” Having said that though, this doesn’t mean Lim ignores the human rights issues or the North Korean political system. The North Korean people’s everyday lives are the main subject of his work but he says he must include the North’s social and other issues so South Koreans will be more willing to accept the reality of North Korea.

He does so because talking about political problems within the context of unique and interesting real lives of North Koreans is much more effective. “Of course South Korean people don’t read the reports that catalogue the horrendous human rights abuses in the North. Only through personal anecdotes, making the reader smile and feel touched, can we inform. Anyone can just read and enjoy, and at the same time the important thing is that they are reading something that truly reflects the reality of North Korea.” Lim does not merely write descriptive prose, but he wants to speak for those in North Korea who cannot speak of their own experiences because of the political and social situation. He feels a sense of duty to speak for those who cannot because of the oppressive society they live in.

“People who truly understand North Korea will want to overthrow the regime and the party because it’s their fault. The North Korean people are exhausted by the many hours they spend daily on pointless ideological education and collective work.”

Lim sometimes receives phone calls from his readers. The books are even sold as testimonies in churches. The deacon of a church in Seoul keeps thanking him for his work. The deacon’s son read all of Lim’s work in a week and then told his father that he was so thankful to him for having him in South Korea. Lim thinking about this says “When I heard his story I was so moved that I can remember like it were yesterday. I thought at the time, ‘This sort of feeling is why I should keep writing.’ At the time, I felt so proud my books can capture the hearts and minds of the young. And even though many people think that a man of letters does not have an important role, I became determined to use what role I have to relate the truth of North Korea and keep writing.”

He emphasised that he hopes the books will be helpful not only to South Koreans, but also to refugees settling in South Korea, too. Because it can show them indirectly his experiences of culture shock and related anecdotes. “It is better to go into an experience (such as culture shock) knowing something about it rather than going into it knowing nothing at all.” A couple years ago, Lim was contacted by a North Korean defector who had sought refuge in South Korea’s embassy in Mongolia and then arrived in the South. The person said that the embassy staff recommended Lim’s book, which he wrote while he was settling in South Korea. Lim also has received a call from a displaced person in the United States. Lim confides that writing the books is very tough but the response of readers makes him feel obliged to keep going.

Searched for Opportunities to Give Unification Lectures at Schools

Lim has also has had his problems. His books initially didn’t sell well. Whilst struggling to earn a living he sought out a place to get his books published. Finding readers is not easy for a writer but faith moves mountains and he found a place. When his first book came out, there were so many North Korean related books that prices were low. As he went from publisher to publisher trying to get it published he got many a cold reaction and started to understand the brutal realities of South Korean society. Publishers also have to make money. He had poured his heart and soul into writing but the reaction was not as good as hoped and thus he was quite frustrated. But Lim did not give up. He went to a school, and whilst introducing his books he asked for the opportunity to give a lecture on unification based in the realities of North Korea. After the third attempt he was given the opportunity. From then on, he received frequent requests for lectures at middle and high schools and he found ways to sell his books.

In the classes that he has taught in South Korean schools Lim says he became aware of just how little South Korean children know about the North. He said that in particular, he was surprised by the effect of left-wing bias in South Korean educators and the results it has. “During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations (1998-2008), there was no ‘unification class’ per se but holding such classes was left up to each school; nonetheless, children didn’t even know the ‘north’ in North Korea. I really began to understand the scope of the problem. When I felt the level of left-wing bias in South Korean teachers’ perspectives on the North, I couldn’t help but worry about unification education. Since then, I have made a concerted effort to teach as much as possible.”

Lim says that in one’s work, if one has confidence and loves what one does then one can overcome any difficulty. Lim, who will now spend his 14th year in South Korea, says that he still has a long way to go but his industriousness and energy in life are his strengths. He explains that “It is indeed not easy for writers to sell their own books. But whilst earning a living is not easy, as a North Korean defector author I have a sense of mission to do whatever it takes to inform the world of life in North Korea and I have not shirked from it.”

Digging One Well is the Shortcut to Successful Settlement

Lim thinks that the most important things are the North Korean refugees settling in the South and South Korean society helping them settle. “The problems of North Koreans living in the North are mainly about food, but in South Korea, not merely earning a living but also money, education, retirement and many other worries are huge headaches for refugees here. Coping with the intensity of a competitive society is particularly difficult.” Whilst saying this, Lim had a pained expression on his face. What he means is that whilst refugees need to be strong, society should also look after them because they are practically beginners in the society. And he said that North Korean defectors must not just resettle themselves physically but also mentally.

“People who escape North Korea today understand capitalist societies better than those who did so around the time I defected. Still, they should keep in mind that the actual South Korean society is quite different from what they see of it from North Korea and China. It is a quite dispassionate society, so defectors should prepare themselves and think of themselves as one-year-old babies if it’s been only a year since their settlement.”

Whatever one is doing, Lim advices that one should not give up halfway through it. “There are students who do a year of university and then take time off. I hope they try to imagine themselves after graduating from university and resist that temptation. Defectors should humbly try to learn the basics. Even working on construction sites they must think of the tough days back home and do their best as they work.”

Finally, he emphasized that for successful settlement, defectors should abandon their past habits and ways of thinking that they had in North Korea; find a suitable job and keep it for at least a year; be humble; and never forget the thankful heart one had upon first entering South Korea.

Related Daily NK article:
Hopes and Fears of a Defector Writer

When looking at the Kim Jong Il regime’s provocations, I defined them as a country that does not even recognize its own brothers. However, in this tour defectors also joined in. In talking with them, I realized that North Korean citizens are victims too…. I think it’s a mistake to view them the same way we view Kim Jong Il’s regime.

The following discussion appeared on pages 58-61 in the September 2011 issue of NK Vision magazine. Translation courtesy of NKnet volunteer Tom Stearns.

Date: August 9, 2011, 2 p.m.
Location: NK Vision Conference Room
Interviewer: Kang Won Cheol
Photographer: Kim Bong Seop
Participants: Kim — — (University of Seoul, Freshman
Korean Studies),
Pak Ji Hye (Konkuk University, Junior, Law)
Lee Da Hoon (Hankuk Academy of Foreign Studies, Junior, Japanese Language)

This year marks 66 years of Korea’s independence. Korea’s independence has endured for half a century, and the division of the Korean peninsula for just as long. As such, in the only divided nation in the world, the South and the North—while as close as can be—have grown far apart. For some time now, the pain of this separation has evolved from indifference into apathy. This cultural phenomenon has caused people to have a negative view of unification, apathy toward the human rights of North Koreans, numbness toward issues of security, among other problems. Sadly, standing at the core of these problems is the younger generation. Some young people who view the apathy of their peers with a concerned eye are rising up against it. A group of 150 of these university students participated in a bike tour that lasted five days and four nights starting this past July 21st. They departed from the Unification Observatory in Goseong, Gangwon Province, passing through Hwacheon, Cheolwon, and so on, 240 kilometers to Imjingak, racing for North Korean human rights and security. It carried even more significance because university students originally from both the South and the North participated in the bike tour together. NK Vision took some time to sit down and talk with a few of the students about their impression of and reasons for participating in the bike tour, as well as North Korean human rights and security. - Editor

Q: What was your reason for participating in the bicycle tour?

Pak Ji Hye: Since my childhood, I’ve had many opportunities to meet North Korean defectors though my mother who worked for the Korean Red Cross supporting defectors during their resettlement. Because of the influence of this kind of home environment, I’ve developed a strong interest in, and affection for, North Korean defectors. So as soon as I saw a poster at my school for a North and South Korean students’ bike tour, I really wanted to take part in it. As I’d done with my mother I wanted to meet North Korean defectors and to get to know more about North Korea through them. Even though I was scared of riding 240 kilometers with strangers through unfamiliar surroundings, I ended up choosing to take part because I thought this could be a life-changing moment for me.

Lee Da Hoon: This last semester, I gave a lot of presentations about North Korea in my classes. Studying and doing research for my presentations made me realize just how little about North Korea I actually knew. I wanted to talk a lot with the North Korean defectors who would be participating in the bike tour, and come to know a little more about North Korea through them. I think another reason I became so interested in this bike tour was that in my spare time I like bike riding. Trekking up and down the mountains in Gangwon Province to reach our destination was quite an experience, wasn’t it? While I am young, I think it is good to challenge myself and achieve my goals, and I thought it would be a good life experience. University students are always looking to build their resumes, but it’s also something I can’t help wanting to put to good use.

Kim: This was my first vacation since becoming a university student, and as such I wanted to get a lot of experience and create good memories. We all participated in the camp and did volunteer work together. At the start of the vacation period I was spending my time productively like I’d planned, when a friend suggested this bicycle tour to me. 240 kilometers of road was pretty intimidating to me, too, but I made up my mind that I would do it together with the other students.

From among the various programs about security and North Korean human rights that occurred during the bicycle tour, what is the strongest impression you received?

Lee Da Hoon: Personally, I thought all the programs were good. If I were to choose one out of all of them, it would be the education about the reality of the human rights situation in North Korea. Before participating in the bike tour, I’d only read data and comic strips about North Korean human rights through the internet. In their own way, these things communicate the truth about North Korean human rights situation as best they can, but there was a limit to how much I could believe through the medium of the Internet. But during this event my belief grew by listening to the North Korean defectors’ testimony and the instructors’ discussions. It hurts to think that the things we take for granted here in South Korea do not even exist in the North. Geographically it’s the closest country to us, but after this bicycle tour I worry about what we will be able to do for them when in a way they have become the farthest country from us.

Kim: Being a defector I usually have an immense interest in national security and the issues of North Korean human rights. So all the programs were productive and good. What made even more of an impression on me was the attitude with which so many of the participants engaged themselves in learning about security and North Korean human rights. The educational programs went on at dinner time, so you would think people would have gotten pretty tired of them. On the contrary, not one person lost interest, and I was moved to see how earnestly people took part and asked questions. Frankly speaking, people in their twenties in South Korea are not interested in North Korean issues let alone issues of security. But the people who participated in this bike tour were different. When I saw how they were on this trip, I realized that those who are in their twenties can in fact do something.

Pak Ji Hye: What I liked the most was talking with the defectors from North Korea. South Koreans don’t have many opportunities to meet with people from North Korea. As a matter of fact, people have a prejudice against them. Through this bike tour, people could remove their prejudices about North Korean defectors. Talking face-to-face with them, so many things occurred to me listening to their stories about the hometowns they came from, the process of escaping and the life of someone resettling here in South Korea. I felt it deep in my heart that these people with the same passion and dreams as we have were not different from us in the least. It was a valuable time to knock down the walls North and South Koreans have between one another.

How has your awareness of security and North Korean human rights changed as a result of the bicycle tour?

Kim: I’ve really changed a lot. Despite being from North Korea, I’ve lost sight of my hometown over time. There are plenty of reasons why I don’t have much time to focus on it — my responsibilities as a student or the pressure of resettling in a completely different social system like South Korea. But I participated in this event and as a result I’ve definitely adopted a sense of duty and responsibility. No matter what anyone says, I am North Korean, and I realized that there’s a lot that that needs to be done for my homeland and for North Korean citizens. My mission is to do my best to improve the human rights of North Koreans and to raise awareness in South Korean society of the actual situation going on in the North. During my remaining years as a university student I’ll do my best to work toward this goal.

Pak Ji Hye: Honestly, this event was so strenuous I haven’t really thought about it. I didn’t know it then but I think an obvious change has come about. The biggest change is that I see reality more deeply. When I would talk about “security” before, I didn’t consider it any of my business but rather someone else’s business—the government’s or the military’s. I thought regular people couldn’t do anything about security, but this made me realize that there are many things I can do. Problems with North Korean human rights are my problems, too. One thing I can do on my own is to organize a small program that can get regular students our age interested in these issues. I think the big change for me was realizing that my own efforts could become a force for improving national security and North Korean human rights, one step at a time.

Lee Da Hoon: My view of how things are in North Korea has changed. If you’re a man (in South Korea) you must receive training to prepare you for your period of military service. I was outraged by the suffering caused by the Korean War and North Korea’s continued military provocations since the war. When the Cheonan submarine incident and the Yeonpyeong Island incident occurred, as a reservist I was as infuriated as anyone else was. When looking at the Kim Jong Il regime’s provocations, I defined them as a country that does not even recognize its own brothers. However, in this tour defectors also joined in. In talking with them, I realized that North Korean citizens are victims too, just like us. Even now they endure an arduous life day after day as their human rights are oppressed under the dictatorship. I think it’s a mistake to view them the same way we view Kim Jong Il’s regime. I think the biggest change for us is changing our awareness like this.

University students who come from both North and South Korea participated together. Let’s each talk a bit about how you felt about each other over the course of the five days and four nights.

Pak Ji Hye: When I first met our team members, I couldn’t distinguish who was from North Korea and who was from South Korea. If my North Korean friend hadn’t taken the initiative and told me I would have had no idea. As I watched my friend, what I felt the most was an endearing affection (정, 情). Since the first day I was so weak and my legs were so tired that I could barely walk. Strained, I was just barely making it up a slope pushing my bike when my North Korean friend gave me a push from behind. I mean, it was hard for my friend, too. I was touched to see how he helped me, and even though we’d only met by chance, I felt that we could depend on each other for help.

Lee Da Hoon: As we progressed together, North and South Koreans together, there was a closeness between us as we had the same skin color and used the same language. However, we had our own separate cultures just as our nations have been separated over the last 60 years. The defectors told me that when they came to South Korea and watched our TV shows, they understood the words they were hearing but they struggled to understand what our expressions meant. That’s how much of a culture difference there is. The time we spent on the bicycle tour inadvertently revealed these kinds of cultural differences. Still, when I saw that this was a complete success, granted whatever cultural differences there might be, I saw that students from North and South Korea can be united.

Kim: I came out of it thinking that we should have more events or activities where students from North and South Korea participate together. There’s usually plenty of opportunities to meet South Korean students at school, but since we don’t really have the chance to open up to each other at those events it can be hard to get close. I think group events like these are a way to bring together students from North and South Korea and unite us; it was like my team members and I opened the doors to our hearts. My team from the bike tour is currently forming a club, and we still exchange information and get together often. If there were one point we hope to make to South Korean students, it’s that we don’t want them to pity North Korean students when they look at us. If they think of us as being the same as they are, we can get rid of the barriers between us more easily and quickly, don’t you think?

Do you have any ideas or ways to help South Korean students find out about what’s really going on in North Korea?

Lee Da Hoon: University students have a lot of exposure to social networks and mass media outlets like TV and movies. I think this is a good alternative use of these media. I think we can make good use of the commercial aspects as well. We can produce movies and shows and then use user-friendly media like Facebook, Twitter and blogs in a way that gets university students’ attention. And if we do that, then I think that we can offer a number of classes in universities to shed light on North Korea. All the schools currently offer classes related to North Korea but they are unpopular. I think this reflects a lack of interest in North Korea. So if we make it compulsory to take a class related to North Korea, I think it will help a lot of students to understand North Korea better. Someday the North and South are going to have to reunite. We need to accept it and prepare in advance for realizing a society in which we can coexist.

Kim: Here in Seoul there are a lot of university students who come from North Korea. I think there’s a way to make the most of this situation. If we all come out and let others know more about North Korea, the South Korean students who take an interest will appear. There were lots of students who participated in the bike tour because they wanted to get to know students from North Korea. I think if we get university clubs or organizations to host activities related to North Korea with students who are from North Korea it will be very popular. I organized a simple gathering in my school about North Korean human rights in my first semester. If we post announcements on the school’s bulletin boards, not just South Korean students but international students will show an interest as well.

Pak Ji Hye: There aren’t a whole lot of university students who are interested in North Korean human rights. There’s even fewer who will bring up the topic when they’re around others. The topic of North Korea is a heavy one and I think political reasons play a role in that. So I think it’s important to find a way to approach the topic lightly with university students. During this semester’s school festival we held a photo exhibition on our campus for a campaign to prevent child abuse. To our surprise, a lot of students took an interest in it. I think holding a photo exhibition on campus that informs students about North Korea would be a good way, wouldn’t it? I think we’ll get the most student interest if we set ourselves up in a way that is approachable for students and do it in a way that surveys their opinions.

What do you want to do for security and North Korean human rights when you get back to campus?

Kim: I want to start a North Korean human rights student group. Unlike some of the other universities, at the University of Seoul there are four of us who come from North Korea. Last semester, I got in touch with them about this idea to make a student group, but I didn’t get much of a response. But I’m not going to stop. I want to make a student group to bring students from North and South Korea together to share their stories, volunteer and hold camps. We currently have about 20 students who participate in some small-scale gatherings, but it’s not a formal group or anything. When the new semester begins I’m going to be more enthusiastic about these activities. I hope we can combine with other student groups for North Korean university students in Seoul and promote more gatherings with their help.

Pak Ji Hye: It would be great to be able to do things for human rights in North Korea on a much larger scale, but realistically it seems to be difficult. So in my opinion, after participating in this bike tour, I want to share what I experienced and felt with the people around me. If I keep talking about it with the people I know, it will get their attention, and in no small way either. I think by getting others interested one person at a time, lots of people will end up taking interest before you know it.

Lee Da Hoon: I’d like to start a group or organization if I could. It’s not true that most students don’t care about these issues. I think I’ll also be talking about these issues with my friends a lot. If we approach this topic in a somber way it can weigh down the mood — I mean over dinner, at a café or bar, or something like that. If we bring the topic of North Korea into the conversation naturally in a personal setting, I think our friends will also show interest in the matter. I think that this is the role I can play at present.

Related Daily NK article and photos:
Trans-Korea Ride to Unification

The following appeared on pages 8-9 as the Publisher’s Column in the January 2012 issue of NK Vision magazine.

In your life, you have to let both those you love and those you hate go. You should accept this as fate, for no human being is immortal. The death of a loved one is of course full of sorrow, but even if the person who died was once hated during his lifetime, it would be morally appropriate to wish him a peaceful rest.

However, this cannot be the case for Kim Jong Il, who died on December 17th, 2011. He was not a mere ordinary person, but was a most brutal dictator in history who not only shook the fate of 23 million North Koreans in his hands, but also caused a huge number of casualties and economic loss in South Korea by ordering numerous terrorist activities such as the Rangoon Bombing, bombing of a Korean Air Lines aircraft, several military provocations in the Yellow Sea, sinking of the naval ship Cheonan, bombardment of Yeonpyeong, and countless other provocations. Also, he was an aggressor who threatened the peace in surrounding countries by developing nuclear weapons and testing missiles. I very much regret that this notoriously bad man died without being properly punished for his misdeeds.

Building the Worst Hereditary Dictatorship

North Korea was founded by communists led by Kim Il Sung on September 9th, 1948. Kim Il Sung inflicted severe sufferings on the North Korean people by establishing a communist regime and strengthening his dictatorship, but it was Kim Jong Il who should be held responsible for: building the worst hereditary dictatorship in the world, one which is not comparable to that of any other communist country; imprisoning hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in political prison camps to let them suffer under conditions fit for beasts; making millions of North Koreans die from malnutrition; making numerous North Koreans wander in foreign countries; reducing people to a foolish state, in which they become unable to tell what’s right and wrong, through brainwashing and fear; and turning the entire nation into a gulag. Therefore, although Kim Jong Il is now dead, we should bring him to the court of history and let him face history’s stern judgment in order to set straight our nation’s (sense of) justice and heighten the conscience of mankind.

The worst of dictators Kim Jong Il is dead, and North Korea is to be led by young Kim Jong Un, a not-even-30-year-old man who was appointed as successor by his father. Some people forecast that North Korea will rapidly collapse from the inside because the succession process was done too hastily and Kim Jong Un is not very experienced. But as we have seen at Kim Jong Il’s funeral and memorial service, the third generation succession is now stabilizing, at least as it appears to those on the outside. And considering that Kim Jong Il had extraordinary talent at seizing and managing power, it is very likely that he prepared various means that would help a smooth transition of power after his death. In China, which is the largest patron of North Korea, all nine members of the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee paid mourning visits to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing and backed the succession in North Korea. In this respect, it is hard to see that North Korea will fall into serious turbulence in the near future.

As we can well see in the world of sports and art, there are many cases where young people achieve magnificent accomplishments. See, for example, figure skater Yuna Kim. However, years of experience are very important in the world of politics. In that regard, it remains to be seen whether Kim Jong Un will coordinate and control high- and mid-level officials well or distribute the positions properly among young, middle aged, and older workers. Young people easily fall into the trap of adventure and impulse, and it is also not certain if officials in their sixties and seventies who were loyal to Kim Jong Il will remain loyal to Kim Jong Un given the higher standing the older generation holds over the younger generations in a Confucian society. In the mid- to long-term, the Kim Jong Un regime will likely be unstable (유동, literally “fluid” – ed.), and it is highly likely that he will face huge obstacles.

Furthermore, North Korean society has gone through massive changes since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. Markets became much more active, and information exchanged there spread at a much faster rates and in much larger amounts. The reputation of the party and the nation gradually collapsed, and eventually hit bottom with the currency reform in November 2009. Although the trumpet sound of the strong and prosperous state rings loudly, the regime now cannot turn people’s hearts back to its side without substantially improving their quality of life. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility of a democratization movement inside North Korea.

High Possibility of a Drastic Change Within 3-5 Years

Since the possibility of a drastic change within 3-5 years is very high, regardless of the short term stabilization of the Kim Jong Un regime, we should thoroughly prepare for this change. A rapid change in North Korea will have immense impact on the South Korean economy and national security, so most South Koreans tend to hope to maintain the status quo in North Korea. Going along with this attitude, some North Korea experts, scholars, politicians, and political groups speak incessantly of an early stabilization of the Kim Jong Un regime and promote a return to the Sunshine Policy.

But if the democratization of North Korea is inevitable, the most fundamental solution would be to focus our efforts on rescuing our North Korean brothers and sisters who have been suffering for more than 60 years. How would it be possible to cure a growing cancer with medicine for blisters or without going through any serious operations? The prospect for a bright future is merely an illusion if there is no commitment and no pain is endured. What lies before us are the noble tasks of rescuing our fellow North Koreans, who moan with agony under dictatorship and human rights abuses, and opposing the unacceptable third generation succession.

Therefore, this year’s two big elections will be an important turning point where we will choose between democratizing North Korea and compromising with the hereditary dictatorship and between expanding democracy beyond South Korea to democratize the whole of the peninsula and retrogressing to a fake democracy (in South Korea) in which people become slaves of populism and pro-North Koreanism. We are now standing at the moment of truth where each and every one of us shall decide whether to lay the foundations of Korean reunification, or to fall into the labyrinth of reaction against history by allying with the feudal dynasty of isolation and human rights violations.

There was a famous advertisement copy that went: “A moment’s decision changes 10 years of the future.” And just like that, our choice in the two elections will change 10 years, or rather 100 years, of the future.

Han Ki Hong is a graduate of Yonsei University with a degree in psychology. He has served as the publisher and editor of Zeitgeist and publisher and CEO of the Daily NK. Since 2000 he has been the president of NKnet.